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11. Introduction
Due to its analytical tractability, the Cobb-Douglas utility function
u : Rn








i (n 2 N;a1;:::;an > 0)
is among the most commonly used in economics. Its name credits Cobb and Douglas (1928), but
its roots can be traced back a few more decades to, among others, Mill, Pareto, and Wicksell.
See Lloyd (2001) for an historical overview.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is so commonplace that its use is hardly ever motivated or
just accompanied by a statement that it concerns a \standard" utility function. If it is motivated
at all, it often uses functional equations: it presumes the existence of a function, imposes some
properties the function must satisfy, and derives that it must be of Cobb-Douglas form. Lloyd
(2001) gives an informal discussion, Eichhorn (1978) the mathematical details.
Rather than simply assuming that a utility function with desirable properties exists, this
note takes things one step back and derives Cobb-Douglas utility functions from rst principles:
what properties of an economic agent's preferences guarantee that they can be represented by
a utility function of Cobb-Douglas type?
This makes the functional equation approach dicult to apply. Ordinal properties of prefer-
ence relations need not translate to well-dened functional equations on a corresponding utility
function: the latter are determined only up to a monotonic transformation.
Section 2 xes our notation. Section 3 contains our characterizations of preference relations
representable by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and a discussion of related literature.
2. Preliminaries
Dene preferences on a set X in terms of a binary relation % (\weakly preferred to") which is:
complete: for all x;y 2 X : x % y;y % x, or both;
transitive: for all x;y;z 2 X, if x % y and y % z, then x % z.
We call a complete, transitive relation % a weak order. As usual, x  y means x % y, but not
y % x, whereas x  y means that both x % y and y % x. Preferences % are represented by
utility function u : X ! R if
8x;y 2 X : x % y , u(x)  u(y):
2Let n 2 N. For vectors x;y 2 Rn, write x  y if xi  yi for all i 2 f1;:::;ng and x < y if
xi < yi for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. Let Rn
+ = fx 2 Rn : x  0g and Rn
++ = fx 2 Rn : x > 0g. For
i 2 f1;:::;ng, let ei 2 Rn be the i-th standard basis vector with i-th coordinate one and all
other coordinates zero; e =
Pn
i=1 ei is the vector of ones. Endow Rn with its standard topology
and subsets with the relative topology.
Let % be a binary relation on X, where X equals Rn, Rn
+, or Rn
++, and dene:
continuity: for each x 2 X, fy 2 X : y  xg and fy 2 X : y  xg are open.
upper semicontinuity: for each x 2 X, fy 2 X : y  xg is open.
additivity: for all x;y;z 2 X, if x % y, then x + z % y + z.
homotheticity: for all x;y 2 X and all scalars t > 0, if x % y, then tx % ty.
homotheticity in coordinate i 2 f1;:::;ng: for all x;y 2 X and all scalars t > 0,
if x % y, then (x1;:::;xi 1;txi;xi+1;:::;xn) % (y1;:::;yi 1;tyi;yi+1;:::;yn).
monotonicity: for all x;y 2 X, if x  y, then x - y.
strict monotonicity: for all x;y 2 X, if x < y, then x  y.
sensitivity: for each i 2 f1;:::;ng, there exist x;y 2 X with xj = yj whenever
j 6= i and x 6 y.
substitutability: for each x 2 X, there is a scalar  such that e 2 X satises
x  e.
Most properties are standard. Sensitivity avoids trivialities: each coordinate matters in pref-
erence relation %. Substitutability is a weak compensation principle: for each alternative,
improvements due to changes in one set of variables can compensate for deteriorations in others
| say, a little more of coordinate i might compensate for a little less of coordinate j | to
\smoothen out" any dierences in the coordinates. In decision theory under uncertainty, where
coordinates correspond with payos in dierent states of nature, this property is known as the
\fair price" principle (Diecidue and Wakker, 2002): each alternative has an equivalent, constant
price . The proof of Theorem 3.1 uses:
Lemma 2.1 [Diecidue and Wakker, 2002, Thm. 2] Consider a binary relation % on Rn.
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) There are nonnegative numbers a1;:::;an adding up to one such that % is represented by
the utility function u : Rn ! R with u(x) =
Pn
i=1 aixi.
3(b) % is a weak order satisfying strict monotonicity, additivity, and substitutability.
Lemma 2.2 [Dow and Werlang, 1992, Thm. 2.1] If a weak order % on Rn
+ is upper
semicontinuous, monotonic, and homothetic, then it is continuous.
3. Representation theorem
Theorem 3.1 provides two characterizations of preferences that can be represented by Cobb-
Douglas utility functions. Normalizing its coecients a1;:::;an to add up to one entails no loss
of generality: utilities are determined only up to a monotonic transformation.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a binary relation % on Rn
+. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) There are nonnegative numbers a1;:::;an adding up to one such that % is represented by





(b) % is a weak order satisfying strict monotonicity, homotheticity in each coordinate, and
substitutability.
(c) % is a weak order satisfying strict monotonicity, homotheticity in each coordinate, and
upper semicontinuity.
The numbers in (a) are positive if and only if % satises sensitivity.
Proof. (a) ) (b) and (a) ) (c): The function u is strictly monotonic (x < y ) u(x) < u(y)),
homogeneous in each coordinate, continuous, and fu(e) :  2 R+g = fu(x) : x 2 Rn
+g = R+.
(b) ) (a): Assume (b) holds. We use Lemma 2.1 to show that % can be represented by a
Cobb-Douglas utility function on Rn
++. The domain is then extended to Rn
+.
Step 1, domain Rn
++: Dene f : Rn ! Rn
++ for each x 2 Rn by f(x) = (expx1;:::;expxn).
As f and its inverse f 1 : Rn
++ ! Rn with f 1(y) = (lny1;:::;lnyn) are continuous, f is a
homeomorphism. Given the weak order % on Rn
++, dene a weak order %f on Rn as follows:
8x;y 2 Rn : x %f y , f(x) % f(y): (1)
The exponential function is strictly increasing, so by substitution in (1), properties imposed on
% carry over in a straightforward way to properties of %f: it is a weak order satisfying strict
monotonicity, and substitutability. Applying coordinatewise homotheticity n times, it follows
that
8x;y;t 2 Rn
++ : x % y ) (t1x1;:::;tnxn) % (t1y1;:::;tnyn):
4Hence, by denition (1), (lnx1;:::;lnxn) %f (lny1;:::;lnyn) implies that
(lnx1;:::;lnxn) + (lnt1;:::;lntn) %f (lny1;:::;lnyn) + (lnt1;:::;lntn):
As f is bijective, it follows that %f is additive.
By Lemma 2.1, there are a1;:::;an  0 with
Pn
i=1 ai = 1 such that %f is represented by
the utility function x 7!
Pn
i=1 aixi. By (1), for all x;y 2 Rn
++:













Step 2, domain Rn
+: To see that u represents % on the entire domain Rn
+, we must establish
that x  0 for each x 2 Rn
+ with some, but not all, coordinates equal to zero. Pick such an x. As
x+(1=n)e 2 Rn
++ for each n 2 N, strict monotonicity implies 0  x+(1=n)e. By substitutability,
there is an "n > 0 with x+(1=n)e  "ne. As at least one coordinate of x+(1=n)e goes to zero:
0 = lim
n!1








By substitutability, x  e for some   0. Positive  are ruled out: x  x + (1=n)e  "ne for
all n 2 N and limn!1 "n = 0. So  must be zero.
(c) ) (b): Assume (c) holds. We show that % satises substitutability. Applying coordinate-
wise homotheticity n times, it follows that % is homothetic. Moreover, % is monotonic: let
x;y 2 Rn
+ have x  y. Then x < y + (1=n)e for all n 2 N, so x - y + (1=n)e (even strictly) by
strict monotonicity. Letting n ! 1 and using that the set of alternatives weakly better than x
is closed by upper semicontinuity, it follows that x - y. So % is continuous by Lemma 2.2.
Substitutability now follows from a standard separation argument: for each x 2 Rn
+, 0e -
x - maxfx1;:::;xnge by monotonicity. As the diagonal D = fe :   0g is a connected set
and % is continuous, there is an   0 with x  e: otherwise, the sets fy 2 Rn
+ : y  xg and
fy 2 Rn
+ : y  xg, open in the relative topology on Rn
+ by continuity, separate D.
Sensitivity: Let i 2 f1;:::;ng. Sensitivity in the i-th coordinate excludes ai = 0. Conversely,
if ai 6= 0, then u("ei +
P
j6=i ej) = "ai establishes sensitivity in the i-th coordinate. 
To my knowledge, the results above are new. Bossert and Weymark (2004, Theorem 11.1), in a
social choice setting, give a special case of the characterization in (c): they assume continuity,
rather than upper semicontinuity. They also refer to related results under additional assumptions
5and on the easier domain Rn
++; cf. Moulin (1988, Theorem 2.3) and Trockel (1989). The domain
Rn
++ avoids the complication that the indierence curve through the origin has a decidedly
dierent shape than indierence curves through points in Rn
++ and essentially allows one to skip
part (in particular, Step 2) of our proof above.
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